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Question of Cyprus

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Letter dated 4 December 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 30 November 2012 addressed to you, from the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Mr. Mehmet Dânâ (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Hüseyin **Müftüoğlu**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 4 December 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the representative of the Greek Cypriot administration at a meeting of the Third Committee on 8 November 2012, under agenda items 69 (b) and 69 (c), entitled "Human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" and "Human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives", respectively, which contain false allegations against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey. Since the Greek Cypriot side is utilizing every opportunity to distort facts pertaining to the question of Cyprus in every international forum where the Turkish Cypriot side is unjustly denied representation, I am compelled to respond, once again, in writing in order to set the record straight.

Throughout the many years following the Greek Cypriot destruction, in 1963, of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side has managed to misinform the international community and to portray the Cyprus problem as one of "invasion" and "occupation", while disguising the suffering and unjust isolation inflicted on the Turkish Cypriot people. The restrictions imposed by the Greek Cypriot side violating the basic human rights of Turkish Cypriots in various fields, such as the rights to freely trade and travel, and to participate in sports competitions, cultural events and educational schemes, are continuing, and efforts to remedy this situation by various parties are still impeded by the Greek Cypriot side. As a matter of fact, none of the Security Council resolutions describe the legitimate and justified Turkish intervention of 1974, undertaken in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as "invasion", or the subsequent presence of Turkish troops on the island as "occupation". Such distortions are purely a Greek Cypriot fabrication aimed at blurring the issue and confusing the innocent with the guilty. On this point, it is imperative to recall the dramatic statement made by Archbishop Makarios, the Greek Cypriot leader at the time, before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, in which he openly accused Greece, not Turkey, of invading and occupying Cyprus. His remarks, which came only four days after the Greek Cypriot coup of 15 July 1974, are well recorded in the annals of the United Nations and hardly require further elaboration.

During the years from 1963 to 1974, which the Greek Cypriot representative conveniently ignores, the Greek Cypriots, aided and encouraged by Greece, practised ethnic cleansing and inflicted terrorism and tyranny on innocent Turkish Cypriots, all in the name of enosis (annexation of the island to Greece). The attempt by Greek Cypriot officials to brush aside the 11-year-long ordeal of the Turkish Cypriots is, to say the least, outrageous. It shows their total insincerity and refusal to show any sign of remorse or an attitude conducive to reconciliation.

In fact, the Greek Cypriot side has rejected all of the United Nations settlement plans proposed to date, including the Annan plan of 2004, which provided concrete advantages to the Greek Cypriot side at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot people. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot side still has the audacity to complain about the current status quo in the island. In this regard, the

observations of the then Secretary-General, following the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan plan, must be remembered:[a]

> The rejection of such a plan by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a major setback. What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint. Benefits for the Greek Cypriots which have been sought for decades — including the reunification of Cyprus, the return of a large swathe of territory, the return of most displaced persons to their homes (including a majority, some 120,000, under Greek Cypriot administration), the withdrawal of all troops not permitted by international treaties, the halting of further Turkish immigration and (if Greek Cypriot figures are accurate) the return to Turkey of a number of "settlers" — have been foregone.

The allegations of the Greek Cypriot representative of the so-called demographic changes in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus through "continuous arrival of settlers from Turkey" are also totally unfounded and are only one aspect of the Greek Cypriot side's ongoing campaign of misinformation and propaganda aimed at distorting the facts and realities in Cyprus. It should be noted that the procedure through which citizenship is acquired in Northern Cyprus is similar to those widely applied throughout the world. It should also be noted in this regard that the Greek Cypriot administration has allowed the resettlement and employment of thousands of non-Greek Cypriot immigrants in Southern Cyprus in addition to its citizens originating from Greece, in accordance with its own legislation. It should be also underlined that the Greek Cypriot policy of naming Turkish Cypriot citizens originating from Turkey and their descendants as "settlers", constitutes clear discrimination against our people on the grounds of ethnicity and place of birth and it is thus totally unacceptable.

In this context, it should be also noted that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus conducted a population census on 4 December 2011 with the participation of seven experts from the United Nations Population Fund. Results of the census show that the de facto population of Northern Cyprus is 294,906, indicating an 11.2 per cent increase in population over the five-year period following the previous census in 2006, which yielded a figure of 265,000. Following the census in the North, representatives from the United Nations have expressed their satisfaction with the results in terms of methodology and transparency and the way in which the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus population census was conducted in general.

Similarly, a population census was also held in South Cyprus in October 2011, results of which indicate a de facto population of 838,897: a 21.7 per cent increase over the results of the previous census held in 2001, which produced a population figure of 689,565. Comparatively, these results show that the populations of the two peoples have increased proportionally to one another, discrediting the oft-repeated Greek Cypriot allegation that there has been a population transfer to Northern Cyprus from Turkey or elsewhere.

Contrary to the Greek Cypriot representative's allegations, the history of human rights violations in Cyprus goes back a long time. Parallel to that, the issue of "refugees" or "internally displaced persons" arose when one fourth of the Turkish Cypriot population was rendered homeless as from December 1963 when Turkish

[a] See report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2004/437) of 28 May 2004, para. 83.

Cypriots had to flee for their lives as a result of the Greek Cypriot onslaught. It is true that many Turkish Cypriots as well as Greek Cypriots were displaced in 1974 as a result of the Greek coup d'état and its aftermath. It is equally true, however, that the question of displaced persons was settled through the Voluntary Exchange of Populations Agreement reached between the two sides at the third round of talks, held in Vienna in 1975. The Agreement was implemented under the supervision of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and both the Agreement and its implementation are well recorded in relevant United Nations documents (S/11789 of 5 August 1975 and S/11789/Add.1 of 10 September 1975).

With respect to the so-called enclaves in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, I wish to remind the Greek Cypriot representative that the term "enclaved" was first used by the Secretary-General to describe the plight, between 1963 and 1974, of the Turkish Cypriots who had been squeezed by the Greek Cypriots into small pockets scattered around the island. The total area of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves was a mere 3 per cent of the territory of the island. Since 1974, the Greek Cypriot side has attempted to "hijack" this term to misrepresent the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, purely for propaganda purposes.

In fact, the Greek Cypriots who chose to stay in North Cyprus after the 1975 Voluntary Exchange of Populations Agreement enjoy all the rights and freedoms that are enjoyed by the citizens of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Their living conditions are on a par with those of the Turkish Cypriots living in the same area. All the Greek Cypriots who opted to cross to South Cyprus over the years have been interviewed exclusively by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus which confirmed that the transfer was voluntary and not the response to any sort of oppressive policies or restrictions. In spite of these recorded realities, the Greek Cypriot administration chooses to exploit the existence of the Greek Cypriot residents in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a propaganda tool for slandering the Turkish Cypriot authorities and Turkey.

It is also important to recall, in this context, that it was the Turkish Cypriot side that took an important initiative on 23 April 2003 and unilaterally opened the border to crossings between North and South Cyprus. This was a bold move by the Turkish Cypriot side towards creating the necessary atmosphere for reconciliation. More recently, the Turkish Cypriot side has proved its goodwill once again and enabled the opening of the Yeşilırmak/Limnitis gate in October 2010 in addition to the already existing crossing points. It is known by all concerned that the opening of the Yeşilırmak/Limnitis gate has provided predominantly for the easy access of the Greek Cypriots living in that region to South Nicosia, as they can directly cross from their place of residence to North Cyprus.

As regards the work of the Committee on Missing Persons, I would like to reiterate the commitment of the Turkish Cypriot side to the work carried out by the Committee in line with the mandate agreed by the two sides under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Owing to the sincere commitment and cooperation of the relevant Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus authorities, as of August 2012, the Committee on Missing Persons, after carrying out exhumations at 609 sites on both sides of the island, has found the remains of 895 persons. To this date, 269 Greek Cypriot and 67 Turkish Cypriot remains have been successfully exhumed, identified and returned to their families. As regards the claim to the effect that the

Committee's access to military areas in the north has been restricted, it should be noted that the Turkish Cypriot authorities have been facilitating the Committee's access to all relevant areas, including military zones in Northern Cyprus. Accordingly, as recorded in paragraph 28 of your report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 28 May 2010 (S/2010/264), the Turkish Cypriot side has "granted access to four new exhumation sites located in military areas in the north". It should be also noted in this regard that permission has recently been granted to the Committee for exhumation in a military area in Northern Cyprus in 2012. Thus, allegations to the effect that access to military areas in the North has been restricted are unwarranted and totally undermine the cooperative approach of the Turkish Cypriot side in this matter.

One of the most fundamental issues of the Cyprus question is that of property. The property issue in Cyprus first arose not in 1974 but in 1963, when the Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their homes at gunpoint and took refuge in what came to be known as Turkish Cypriot enclaves. It should be stressed that it is not only the Greek Cypriots who left immovable property, in the North but also the Turkish Cypriots who had to abandon a considerable amount of property in the South as well, most of which was confiscated by the Greek Cypriot administration, leaving no possibility for restitution and/or compensation to the Turkish Cypriots for the use and enjoyment of their properties. Instead of seeking to resolve the issue with the Turkish Cypriot side in accordance with established parameters, the Greek Cypriot side has, over the years, encouraged recourse to the European Court of Human Rights in a bid to bring the issue to the European platform.

We, as the Turkish Cypriot side, have always adopted a fair approach to the issue of property. The status of property left by the Greek Cypriots is defined clearly by the relevant clauses of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The sole legitimate authority in matters related to ownership of land and property within the boundaries of North Cyprus is the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, elected under and by virtue of the Constitution. The Turkish Cypriot side never denied the inalienable right to property and thus, on the basis of the guidelines suggested by the European Court of Human Rights, the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus enacted the Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties.

In accordance with this Law, the Immovable Property Commission was established on 22 March 2006 with a view to providing an effective domestic remedy, namely restitution, compensation and exchange, for claims related to abandoned properties in Northern Cyprus. In this context, it is important to note that, on 1 March 2010, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the case of *Demopoulos v. Turkey* was inadmissible and ruled, inter alia, that the Immovable Property Commission "provides an accessible and effective framework of redress in respect of complaints about interference with the property owned by Greek Cypriots". It has thus been legally acknowledged that the Commission provides an effective domestic remedy for Greek Cypriot claims related to properties in North Cyprus. It also needs to be stressed that the above-mentioned decision of the European Court of Human Rights came after a series of other cases involving individual claims on property had been brought before the Court by the Greek Cypriot side. The decision also served as a clear message to the Greek Cypriot administration that, in the case of Cyprus, issues related to property

need to be resolved domestically and taking into account the special circumstances of the island.

It is clear from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights noted above that Greek Cypriots are not without remedies, and that they can apply to the Immovable Property Commission for restitution, compensation and exchange which are being assessed on the basis of criteria established by the Court. Despite the ill-intentioned attempts of the Greek Cypriot administration to deter Greek Cypriots from applying to the Commission, as of 30 November 2012, 4,157 applications had been lodged with the Commission, of which 310 have been concluded. The Commission has paid over 93 million British pounds to the applicants as compensation. It should also be noted that the Greek Cypriot administration continues to disseminate false and misleading information, particularly by portraying the issue as solely affecting the Greek Cypriot people. In reality, long before it became a problem for the Greek Cypriots, the issue of property had been affecting the Turkish Cypriot people, thousands of whom were forced to leave their homes and properties between 1963 and 1974, as a result of Greek Cypriot armed attacks. As is known, the reciprocal property claims of the two sides constitute one of the major topics of discussion in the negotiating process involving the two sides, which has been conducted since 1968 under the auspices of the United Nations.

The policies of the Greek Cypriot administration vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriot properties left in the South are in total contradiction with its professed role of "champion" of ownership rights in Cyprus. Following its hijacking of the partnership government in 1963, the Greek Cypriot administration unilaterally enacted a series of laws designed to regulate and control Turkish Cypriot-owned land and properties located in South Cyprus. Accordingly, the major part of Turkish Cypriot land and properties was allocated to Greek Cypriots and the remaining land and properties have been and are still being acquired on a compulsory basis by the Greek Cypriot authorities. In line with its so-called guardianship regulations, no compensation has ever been paid to the Turkish Cypriot owners, who for all practical purposes are being told through Greek Cypriot court decisions to await the final settlement of the Cyprus question. It should be duly noted that the Greek Cypriot side has failed to propose any mechanism, similar to the Immovable Property Commission in the North, for handling the property claims.

As for the allegations regarding the so-called destruction of the cultural heritage in North Cyprus, I would like to emphasize that protection of the island's cultural heritage is of great importance to the Turkish Cypriot side, since the cultural heritage of Cyprus, whether in the North or in the South, derives from the diverse and rich cultures of the civilizations that have populated the island throughout history. It is the common heritage of humanity, regardless of its origin, and should be protected and preserved.

In this respect, since 2006, 15 Greek Orthodox churches have been restored by our authorities, and other projects of restoration, of churches, mosques, monasteries and other monuments, have been undertaken with the collaboration of the United Nations Development Programme Partnership for the Future programme and the UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust in Cyprus. Restoration work on some other churches and monasteries are currently under way with the support of the Action for Cooperation and Truth and the Government of the United States of America. In the

last three years alone, almost 400,000 United States dollars have been spent by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus authorities on cultural heritage restoration projects, in addition to the funds made available by the European Union and USAID.

It is also worth mentioning at this point that the 21 March 2008 agreement reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides has paved the way for the establishment of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, among others, which has provided a significant impetus for the protection of the rich and varied cultural heritage of the island. In line with the mandate given to it, since May 2008, the Technical Committee has held more than 145 meetings and has made close to 300 on-site visits to the cultural heritage monuments on both sides of the island.

On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus has shown utter contempt for the Turkish-Muslim heritage in Southern Cyprus, where cultural and religious monuments, including mosques, baths, fountains and cemeteries, are under threat of destruction. I will mention here merely that hundreds of Turkish Cypriot villages, together with their mosques, have been razed to the ground since 1963. While claiming to care very much for the cultural heritage of the island, the Greek Cypriot administration at the same time attempts to block, often with success, initiatives of the Turkish Cypriot authorities to receive funds from international institutions and third parties for the protection of the cultural heritage in North Cyprus, where most of the cultural monuments are located.

Against this background, it is clear that the slanderous remarks of the Greek Cypriot representative against Turkey are not corroborated by the legal and historical facts concerning the island. Thus, instead of levelling unfounded accusations against Turkey in order to play the role of the victim in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot administration, cognizant of the fact that its counterpart is the Turkish Cypriot side, is expected to adopt a more positive approach within the context of the efforts carried out for a fair and durable comprehensive settlement in Cyprus under your mission of good offices.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2012/920

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 December 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 12 December 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you the enclosed statement made by the Government of the Republic of Korea as a response to the long-range missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 December 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have it circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) **KIM** Sook
Ambassador

12-64457 (E) 121212

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Annex to the letter dated 12 December 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement by the Government of the Republic of Korea on North Korea's Missile Launch

- The Government of the Republic of Korea detected that North Korea once again launched a long-range missile, using the name "a working satellite", at 0951 on 12 December 2012, at a launching site located in Cholsan-gun, North Pyongan province.
- The launch by North Korea is a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which prohibit any launch using ballistic missile technology, and constitutes an act of defiance which threatens not only the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula but also international peace and security.
- The Government of the Republic of Korea joins the international community in strongly condemning North Korea's decision to push forward with the provocative act, disregarding the international community's repeated warnings and calls for the withdrawal of the launch. North Korea will be held duly accountable for its actions, as clearly warned by the Security Council in its Presidential statement of 16 April 2012.
- North Korea will be further isolated from the international community as a result of this launch. The Government of the Republic of Korea once again urges North Korea to use its enormous amount of resources to enhance the livelihood of its people, rather than wasting them in developing nuclear weapons and missiles.
- The Government of the Republic of Korea is maintaining a high readiness posture against North Korea's nuclear and missile threat, as well as any other provocation by North Korea, and will take corresponding measures against the launch in close coordination with related countries and the international community.

United Nations S/2012/921

Security Council

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12 December 2012
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Original: French

Letter dated 12 December 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the attached communication dated 7 December 2012 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, transmitting the progress report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, covering the period from 1 August to 31 October 2012 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and the annex thereto to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-Moon

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Annex

Letter dated 7 December 2012 from the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2011) and 2069 (2012), I attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from 1 August to 31 October 2012 (see enclosure). I would appreciate if you would make this report available to the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Anders Fogh **Rasmussen**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the United Nations on the Operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to the request under Security Council resolution 2069 (2012), informs the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force, covering the period from 1 August to 31 October 2012.

2. Since the last reporting period (see S/2012/692), the total number of ISAF troops has decreased, in accordance with NATO redeployment planning. There are currently around 106,800 personnel in theatre, provided by 28 NATO countries and 22 non-NATO countries.

3. NATO reiterates the invitation to additional United Nations Member States to support this United Nations-mandated mission by providing advisers and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces. Additionally, United Nations Member States are invited to provide funding support to the Afghan security forces, and to the civilian sectors of governance and development.

4. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 August to 31 October 2012, ISAF suffered 817 casualties, including 72 killed in action, 740 wounded in action and 5 non-battle-related deaths. In the same period, the Afghan security forces suffered 2,078 casualties, including 560 killed in action and 1,420 wounded in action.[1]

5. During the reporting period, the number of reported security incidents was generally in line with seasonal trends. The total number of security incidents was slightly down when compared to the same period in 2011. Insurgent efforts to maintain their operational tempo with high profile attacks and assassinations were largely ineffective owing to a combination of Afghan and ISAF operations. As a result of improved effectiveness of the Afghan security forces, the insurgency did not regain lost territory and the majority of Afghans remained unaffected by insurgent attacks.[2]

6. During the reporting period, the insurgency was responsible for approximately 94 per cent of total civilian casualties.[3] ISAF continues to work with the Afghan security forces to make every effort to protect the Afghan population and to prevent and mitigate civilian casualties.

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[1] This Afghan security forces casualty data is for information purposes only. It reflects the information made available to ISAF and could differ from official numbers published by the relevant Afghan authorities.

[2] From January to October 2012, 80 per cent of enemy-initiated attacks took place in areas where only 18 per cent of the population lives.

[3] Total civilian casualties refers to confirmed civilian casualties directly attributable to either ISAF or insurgent military action; ISAF-caused civilian casualties figures include road traffic accidents.

7. During the reporting period, ISAF, supported by the international community, started to prepare to transfer those tasks that it will no longer perform after 2014 to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or other national or international agencies, as appropriate.

Security situation

8. During the reporting period, enemy-initiated attacks[4] declined 10 per cent when compared to the same quarter in 2011. The insurgents continued to avoid decisive engagements and gave priority to the use of improvised explosive devices. Assassination attacks against officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continued, as the insurgents attempted to disrupt the Government's ability to carry out effective governance and provide security. The insurgency continued to mainly affect the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, with 90 per cent of security incidents[5] being reported within Regional Command Southwest, Regional Command South and Regional Command East. Insider attacks remain a major challenge for ISAF and the Afghan security forces, as the attacks have the potential to strain the relationship between the Afghan security forces and ISAF.



9. Regionally, the security situation is as follows:

(a) Regional Command Southwest. Enemy-initiated attacks for the reporting period decreased by 19 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The central Helmand River Valley was the most contested area in Regional Command Southwest. Despite the efforts of the Afghan security forces and ISAF, the security situation in Northern Helmand Province continued to be influenced by insurgent activity. Afghan security forces and ISAF operations resulted in a slight, but steady, decrease in the number of security incidents in the region. This area will remain

[4] EIA comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions/mine strikes).

[5] Security incidents comprise all IIAs and include in addition potential IEDs attack, namely IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, as well as premature IED detonations and IED turn-ins.

significant for the insurgency, and ISAF assesses that the insurgents will continue their attempts to regain their lost powerbase.



(b) Regional Command South. Enemy-initiated attacks for the reporting period decreased by 18 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. Insurgent attempts to regain influence, recapture lost safe havens, and re-establish freedom of movement failed as a result of improved capabilities of the Afghan security forces and the success of combined team operations. Direct fire remained the primary means of engagement, followed by improvised explosive devices. As in other Regional Commands the insurgents will seek to increase assassinations of Afghan security forces and officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in an attempt to undermine the local population's perception of security.



(c) Regional Command East. Enemy-initiated attacks in the reporting period decreased by 4 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The insurgency in Regional Command East is assessed to be more fragmented when compared to other Regional Commands, mainly owing to the geography and differences in intent and

agenda of each insurgent group. The border situation significantly influences insurgent activity in Regional Command East. The lack of improvement in a unified approach to cross-border incidents, from both sides of the border, allows the insurgents to maintain significant freedom of movement, allowing them to use the border area for both criminal and insurgent activities.



(d) Regional Command North. Although enemy-initiated attacks in the reporting period increased by 63 per cent compared to the same period in 2011, they remained low in comparison to most Regional Commands. The insurgency is unlikely to sustain a significant and centralized effort within Regional Command North, owing to the continuous pressure from the Afghan security forces and the National Directorate of Security. Facing increased effectiveness of the Afghan security forces, the insurgency reacted with high-profile attacks resulting in many civilians casualties (such as the attack in Maimanah on 26 October). The complex web of interests, where the insurgents' interests often intersect with the local powerbrokers and smuggling groups in border areas, remain a challenge for the Afghan security forces.



(e) Regional Command West. Enemy-initiated attacks in the reporting period increased by 5 per cent compared to the same period in 2011, while remaining low in comparison to most Regional Commands. This increase is largely owing to increased Afghan security forces/ISAF security operations, forcing the insurgents to react. Insurgent attacks to disrupt the freedom of movement of ISAF and Afghan security forces will likely continue throughout the west of Afghanistan.



(f) Regional Command Capital. Enemy-initiated attacks in the reporting period remained low and decreased by 40 per cent compared to the same period in 2011. The suicide attack in the green zone of Kabul City on 8 September, causing serious civilian casualties, was the most significant event. Effective Afghan security and ISAF operations continued to disrupt insurgent attack plans in Kabul City, and the Afghan security forces responded effectively to security incidents when they occurred. Kabul Province will likely continue to be the target of attempted high-profile attacks, owing to the significant media and subsequent political attention they receive.



Afghan National Security Forces

10. As Afghanistan entered tranche 3 of the transition process, the Afghan security forces assumed security lead for over 75 per cent of the Afghan population. Meanwhile, the Afghan security forces continued to grow in overall force size and met their October 2012 goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 soldiers and police. However, these figures include a number of Afghan security forces who were recruited but are still awaiting induction into their respective training centres. With the quantitative goal reached, Afghan security forces development will now be primarily focused on the consolidation of the Afghan lead for security, professionalization of the force and the fielding of newly established army and police units.

11. During this quarter, the Afghan security forces increasingly took the lead in conventional operations across Afghanistan, leading over 80 per cent of the total operations, while the number of ISAF-led operations decreased simultaneously. However, as the Afghan security forces came to the fore, they sustained increased casualties.

12. The operational effectiveness[6] of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police continued to improve, with 30 Afghan National Army and 49 Afghan National Police units currently rated as "independent with advisers", the highest total to date. A new assessment cycle is currently under way and will likely confirm this positive trend. ISAF assesses that adviser teams are important for fostering Afghan leadership and improving overall effectiveness of the Afghan security forces.

13. The decision to initially grow the Afghan security forces (force size), followed by a focus on "balancing the force" through the development of enablers and professionalization of the ranks, was made several years ago with an understanding that it would entail risk along the way. The Afghan security forces, once built to size, would, for instance, suffer from logistics and other shortfalls. The Afghan security forces continues to require enabling support, including air (both transport and close support), logistics, medical, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance from the Coalition to perform at the level necessary to produce all the security effects required for transition. Non-commissioned officer shortages in the Afghan security forces also remain a challenge, with the Afghan National Army requiring an additional 7,000 non-commissioned officers and the Afghan National Police requiring an additional 9,400 non-commissioned officers. Additionally, overall attrition in the Afghan National Army remains a concern, as it was higher than the predicted 1.4 per cent per month for five of the past six months, and exceeded 2 per cent for three straight months.

14. Overall the Afghan National Security Forces has progressed significantly, but continues to face challenges to its development. ISAF is currently addressing these issues, but they will require a medium- to long-term effort.

[6] Afghan security forces units are assessed as "*Established*", "*Developing*", "*Effective with Partners*", "*Effective with Advisors*" or "*Independent with Advisors*".

Afghan National Army

15. During the reporting period, the Afghan National Army grew in size to approximately 182,209 (not including 15,068 soldiers in training, the Afghan Air Force and civilian personnel). There are 352 women in the Afghan National Army (not including 20 in training). The Afghan National Army unit fielding plan will be completed in late 2013. With the growth of the Commandos and Special Operation Forces, and with the addition of special aviation and elite mobile strike force units, the newly formed Afghan National Army Special Operations Command grew from a brigade-sized element to the first division-sized Special Operation Forces unit in Afghan military history. Approximately 10,000 personnel are under the command of the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command, which is becoming the key operational element, successfully pressuring the insurgency across the country.

16. Despite certain challenges, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan strives to professionalize the Afghan security forces. Averages of 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers are in training every day and 8,000 complete training every month. With 2,552 Afghan trainers, the Afghan National Army is becoming less dependent on the Coalition Forces and construction has begun on the Afghan National Army Officers Academy. The Academy is scheduled to open in the first quarter of 2013 and will create a training facility that will prepare new officers for leadership roles within the Afghan National Army. The Academy will have the capacity to train 1,500 officer candidates a year.

Afghan Air Force

17. Afghan Air Force development is under way. The force comprises 96 aircraft, 54 of which are helicopters. There are 6,224 personnel (not including 512 in training) assigned to the Afghan Air Force, and the force remains on track towards its end-strength at 8,000 in December 2014. There are 27 women in the Afghan Air Force. Currently, 62 Afghan pilots are assigned to operational flying units. There are 95 pilots in training, 81 student pilots are training abroad in various stages and 14 are in training at Shindand Air Base.

18. On 15 October 2012, Shindand Air Wing graduated its first fixed-wing pilots in over 30 years; these three pilots are the first to complete the fixed-wing undergraduate pilot training programme since the beginning of the NATO air training mission for Afghanistan, which started in 2007. Key challenges to totally autonomous Afghan Air Force operations before 2014 are investments in (and sustainment of) new hardware, continued development of Afghan Air Force leadership, and Light Air Support (legacy Mi-35) and Medium-range Airlift (C-27/G222) operations.

Afghan National Police

19. After temporarily halting recruitment of new patrolmen in order to train and promote new non-commissioned officers, the Afghan National Police will likely achieve its target of 157,000 personnel by February 2013. It reached 147,158 personnel (not including 5,696 in training) in late September (1,455 of whom are women).

20. The professionalization of the police and intensive training efforts allow the Afghan National Police to graduate an average of 3,600 policemen per month. Able

to rely on a full network of training centres, the Afghan National Police is diversifying its own operational capabilities in intelligence, counter-narcotics, anti-crime, medical, fire, traffic and training areas. On 20 September 2012, 69 Afghan National Police officers graduated from the first entirely Afghan-led Officer Candidate School without any support from Coalition advisers.

21. Compared to previous reporting periods, the Afghan National Police is currently more professional and balanced, is steadily improving its operational effectiveness, and is able to meet the requirements to take the lead for security in transitioned areas.

Civilian casualties

22. Overall, civilian casualties continue to be of significant concern to ISAF and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Minimizing the number and scale of civilian casualty incidents remains of critical importance to ISAF. Moreover, the need to effectively manage the consequences of such incidents when they occur is also considered as vitally important.

23. Considering ISAF-caused and insurgency-caused civilian casualties during the reporting period, the number of confirmed civilian casualties this year is 33 per cent higher than in 2011 (1,394 compared to 1,048). Reporting indicates that insurgents are responsible for causing 94 per cent of these civilian combat-related deaths, and are responsible for 91 per cent civilian casualty incidents.



24. During this same reporting period, ISAF was identified as responsible for only 9 per cent of civilian casualty-related incidents, which is representative of a continued decreasing trend. The number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF this year is 48 per cent lower than in 2011. However, insurgents can still exploit and manipulate events related to civilian casualties to their advantage, since ISAF appears to be held accountable by the Afghan population for all incidents where civilian casualties occur.

25. As ISAF hands over more of the security responsibility to the Afghan security forces, it is assessed that the numbers of ISAF-caused civilian casualties will continue to decrease.

Counter-narcotics

26. In conjunction with the international community, ISAF continues to provide support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics programmes and operations directed against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. ISAF continues to be a key enabler of the Afghan civilian and law enforcement counter-narcotics efforts, and also supports critical economic development and governance programmes through the indirect provision of security.

27. At the end of the reporting period, farmers harvested the cannabis and began planting poppy in the main producing areas of the south and south-west, which account for over 90 per cent of the poppy cultivated in Afghanistan. ISAF currently has limited data on the results of the poppy eradication conducted in 2012. However, the 154 per cent increase in eradication in 2012 did result in an initial reduction of the opium output, as farmers in Badakhshan and Helmand Provinces harvested early in the belief that eradication efforts were a credible threat. However, some of the successes of the eradication campaign were negated by local corruption, such as the Afghan security forces eliciting bribes in exchange for protection from eradication. Moreover, in spite of the increase in the eradication, the poppy-cultivated area increased by 18 per cent.

28. Overall, it is assessed that the eradication campaign in 2012 is indicative of expanding rule of law, although it risks pushing poppy cultivation into non-traditional growing areas, more than impacting overall cultivation levels.

29. The removal of Helmand Province Governor Mangal will also impact counter-narcotics efforts. Helmand Province continues to account for almost half of the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, despite the fact that Governor Mangal successfully reduced cultivation levels by almost 40 per cent from their peak in 2008 through the use of the Helmand Food Zone programme. This programme represents the most successful counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan to date, and has served as an example to other provincial counter-narcotics programmes. As Helmand Province has set the example for Government-wide counter-narcotics efforts, it remains to be seen if the removal of Governor Mangal will set back counter-narcotics efforts not only in Helmand Province, but also in other provinces.

30. Due to the resiliency of the narcotics trade and the fact that eradication and interdiction efforts did not remove enough opium from the market to significantly reduce narcotics productions levels, only a limited impact on insurgent revenue is expected. Unless security is maintained, corruption is addressed and the political will and capacity to conduct counter-narcotics operations is increased, poppy cultivation and opium production will likely rebound in the near future.

Governance

31. ISAF continues to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in ensuring that international resources and development assistance are not subjected to fraud and corruption. To date, ISAF has reviewed more than

$47 billion worth of contracts, debarred 126 companies (up from 120 the previous quarter) and referred an additional 32 cases to suspension/debarment officials of multiple agencies.

32. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme continues to progress. Over the past 12 months, the number of reintegrees has increased from 2,246 to 5,044, with an additional 900 currently enrolled or in the reintegration process. ISAF continues to support the Afghan Government in order to improve capacity of the programme, principally through the provincial peace councils and the joint secretariat teams, although a lack of dedicated Government personnel resourcing means a limited capacity to deliver, and this is a reflection of the speed with which the programme was established.

33. National Peace and Unity Week took place from 19 to 26 September 2012, and improved Afghans' awareness of the High Peace Council and the joint secretariat. The week consisted of over 190 events in all 34 provinces, with the direct participation of over 20,000 Afghans. The Kabul-based events made a significant contribution to the wider international understanding of the Government's role in the peace process, while the events across the country were vital in spreading the message to local Afghans.

34. During the reporting period, Afghan institutions continued to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), and made progress in putting together a public awareness campaign on violence against women, as well as in engaging with religious leaders on the issue. However, some of the implementation measures have been assessed to be quick fixes, not initiated in accordance with the spirit of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). For example, women working inside Government structures are still not being adequately supported and are often not performing the work they are trained and/or hired for.

35. In both the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, gender, human rights and child rights units have been set up, but, as they have only been recently created, their effect are yet to be seen.

36. ISAF remains strongly committed to its support of monitoring and reporting of human rights violations against children by armed actors, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). An ISAF standard operating procedure has been drafted to provide additional directives and guidance on the prevention of human rights abuse against children.

Transition

37. Following President Karzai's announcement of tranche 3 earlier this year, over 75 per cent of the Afghan population now live in areas where the Afghan security forces have the lead for security. Out of the 14 tranche 3 transition ceremonies, 9 were conducted by the end of the reporting period. Planning for the next tranches continues, with the Afghan Government in the lead and ISAF assisting and facilitating, particularly to encourage the participation of non-security ministries. Combined (Afghan security forces and ISAF) transition planning teams visited each of the Regional Operational Coordination Centres in August and September and provided reports to the Transition assessments and planning conference, which was held by the Afghan Ministry of Defence in October 2012.

38. The announcement of tranche 4 is expected in December 2012, with implementation to begin in the first semester of 2013. Completion of the transition process is scheduled for the end of 2014, at which time the Afghan security forces will have full responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.

Development

39. A provincial reconstruction team synchronization conference was held in September 2012. It hosted military and civilian representatives from ISAF, seven Afghan ministries, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the Transition Coordination Commission, the World Bank, the United Nations, the European Union police mission, and 17 embassy representatives. The aim of the conference was to improve coordination between the stakeholders and support the contributing Government's ownership on provincial reconstruction team evolution. As provincial reconstruction teams are closing down, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative Office and ISAF will continue to support the Independent Directorate of Local Governance's lead in this process, and will encourage and assist the Independent Directorate of Local Governance to synchronize provincial reconstruction team efforts.